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Abstract: Limited progress in nutrition policy action is often blamed on the close relationships the
food industry has with health policy decision-makers. This analysis sought to examine this belief
through the analysis of health ministers’ diaries. Entries were downloaded from health ministers’
diaries from two states in Australia from January 2013 to June 2018. Entries were coded according
to which interest group met with the minister or whether general parliamentary business was
undertaken. Coding was also undertaken for any meeting topics related to nutrition policy. Analysis
of health ministers’ diaries found that the food industry has limited documented interaction with
the two state health ministers in Australia. Instead, medical associations, private hospitals and
health services, and sporting associations (rugby league associations) had the most interactions with
health ministers. Poor representation was seen on nutrition issues, and there was an apparent lack
of nutrition advocates interacting with the health ministers. There are opportunities for nutrition
advocates to increase their level of interaction with state health ministers. This could include building
alliances with medical associations, as they are in a powerful position, to advocate directly to health
ministers. Health ministers’ diaries can provide valuable insights into who is meeting officially with
ministers. However, there are also limitations with the dataset.
Keywords: nutrition policy; advocacy; food industry; public health; health policy; lobbying;
policy making
1. Introduction
There are many ways interest groups can attempt to influence public policy. Strategies can
include engaging with the media, shaping the evidence base, making donations to political parties and
grassroots campaigns [1,2]. While these strategies are important, direct access to policymakers seems to
play a significant role in influencing public policy, particularly for policy that is contested [3,4]. Gaining
direct access to policymakers allows interest groups to develop relationships with them, deliver their
arguments more effectively and identify potential policy leverage points [2].
A particularly contested health policy area in many countries is public health nutrition policy [5,6].
This has certainly been the case in Australia, where, over the past decade, there has been a distinct
lack of political support for evidence-based nutrition policy actions, such as fiscal and regulatory
interventions [4,7]. Instead, the government has supported education-based campaigns and voluntary
initiatives involving the food industry [8]. It has been proposed that this inaction in nutrition policy is
due to the opposing power of food industry interest groups [1,7,9]. The power and influence of the food
industry was recently demonstrated in a network analysis of national nutrition policy stakeholders
in Australia [4]. This analysis highlighted that the food industry had the greatest number of direct
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access points to nutrition policymakers than any other interest group. However, limited investigation
of interest groups and their interactions with policymakers has occurred at the state jurisdictional level
in Australia.
Examining the interactions of interest groups at a state level is important, as Australia is a federation
of six states and two self-governing territories, each of which have their own constitutions and laws.
However, certain areas of law-making require both the state and national levels of government to work
together to achieve policy outcomes [7]. This can give states a high degree of power when considering
nutrition policy.
In January 2013, the state of Queensland (QLD) was the first jurisdiction in Australia to require
government ministers to release their diaries on a monthly basis [10] and the state of New South Wales
(NSW) followed in July 2014, although with quarterly releases [11]. While this was an important step
toward transparency, in both jurisdictions, there is no requirement to disclose information relating to
personal, electorate or party-political matters, social or public functions or events, or matters for which
there is an over-riding public interest against disclosure [10,11].
The diaries are available for two jurisdictions which represent just over half of the Australian
population (NSW: 7,955,900; QLD: 4,999,700) [12]. Further information on these states and the political
parties in Australia is included in Box 1. Analysing the health ministers’ diaries from these two states
provided unique insight into which interest groups were interacting with health ministers generally,
and in particular, with respect to nutrition policy.
Box 1. The jurisdictions of New South Wales and Queensland.
The jurisdictions of New South Wales and Queensland.
New South Wales is considered the most powerful state in Australia, as it has the largest population and
economy [13]. Furthermore, it is a manufacturing state and many national and international companies have
their headquarters located there. QLD is known for agriculture, mining and tourism and is the third wealthiest
state in Australia [13]. Since ministerial diaries have been recorded, QLD has had a change of governing political
party, going from the Liberal-National Party (centre-right liberal conservative) to the Australian Labour Party
(centre-left), whereas in NSW the Liberal Party (centre-right liberal conservative) has been the governing party
throughout. The changes in political party and ministers are included in the table below (Table 1). During this
period, NSW appointed an Assistant Health Minister to support the Health Minister. Assistant Ministers are
appointed to support Ministers in prioritising work to facilitate public access to the executive and to enable the
bureaucracy to have an ongoing point of contact [14]. They do not attend executive council or cabinet meetings.
This position was abolished in NSW in January 2017.
Table 1. Changes in health ministers in New South Wales and Queensland (2013–2018).
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
QLD Health
Min L. Springborg
a L. Springborg a C. Dick b C. Dick b C. Dick b S. Miles b
NSW Health
Min J. Skinner
a J. Skinner a J. Skinner a B. Hazzard a B. Hazzard a
NSW
Assistant
Health Min
J. Rowell (also Minister
for mental health) a
P. Goward (also
Minister for mental
health, women &
medical research) a
P. Goward (also
Minister for mental
health, women &
medical research) a
a Centre-right liberal conservative political party (LP or LNP); b Centre-left political party (ALP).
2. Materials and Methods
Ministers’ diaries from January 2013 to June 2018 were downloaded as PDFs from the relevant
government websites and data were extracted into an excel spreadsheet. Diary entries were coded
according to which interest group was meeting with the minister or if general parliamentary/portfolio
business was undertaken. These were broadly classified into four categories:
• advocacy: including not-for-profit groups, charities, citizen groups and professional associations,
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• business: including for-profit organisations, businesses and their peak bodies,
• university: public universities or public research institutions, and
• general business: any standard parliamentary/portfolio business, community electorate
meetings, etc.
Several entries were documented as ‘business receptions’; for the QLD ministers, the diaries
generally detailed each company who came to these receptions. When 25 companies or fewer were
present, each company was coded individually. When more than 25 companies attended these
events, they were coded as ‘general business receptions’, and companies were not coded individually,
as potential one-on-one time with the minister would be decreased.
Once each diary entry was coded individually and within the four categories above, the individual
entries were collated into general codes around their professional focus, for example, bank, food
company, medical association, and cancer organisation. This coding framework was applied to all the
diary entries. The initial coding and development of the coding framework was conducted by one
investigator and then discussed with the co-authors until consensus was reached. The first author then
deductively coded all the diary entries using the agreed framework. Coding was also undertaken for
meeting topics specifically around nutrition. Ten percent of the diary entries were double-coded by an
independent research assistant.
3. Results
In total, 5025 diary entries were coded. QLD health ministers’ diaries covered a period of 63 months
and included 3926 diary entries. NSW health ministers’ diaries covered 48 months and included
586 diary entries, while the diaries of the Assistant Health Minister for NSW covered 31 months
and included 513 diary entries. The two jurisdictions record diary entries differently, with the QLD
ministers’ diaries recording all appointments including general business, and the diaries of the NSW
Health Minister and Assistant Minister including limited records of these appointments. To ensure
comparability, appointments related to general business were removed. However, it is interesting to
note that in the QLD ministers’ diaries, the majority of entries related to general portfolio and electoral
business, whereas meetings with interests groups made up only 27% of all diary entries.
The average number of appointments ministers spent with the different interest groups per month
can be seen in Table 2.
Table 2. Average numbers of recorded appointments with interest groups in ministers’ diaries, per
month (January 2013–June 2018).
Minister Time Period
Advocacy
(Number of
Appointments/Month)
Business
(Number of
Appointments/Month)
Universities
(Number of
Appointments/Month)
Health Minister
QLD (LNP) 24 months 9.6 5.5 1.3
Health Minister
QLD (ALP) 39 months 11.3 5.1 1.3
Health Minister
NSW 48 months 6.0 4.1 1.8
Assistant Health
Minister NSW 31 months 10.7 2.6 1.7
According to the diaries, the QLD health ministers, regardless of political party, spent considerably
more time interacting with advocacy and business groups than the NSW Health Minister. This is even
more pronounced for the ALP QLD Health Minister who, on average, interacted with advocacy groups
and business representatives almost twice as frequently as the NSW Health Minister.
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Doctors Rule
For advocacy groups, it was clear that across political parties and states, medical associations
were dominant in interactions with health ministers. This was particularly evident for the ‘doctors’
union’, the Australian Medical Association (AMA) (Table 3). Rates of interactions between medical
associations and the ministers were higher than any other group. Other medical associations that were
highly represented across all ministers’ diaries were the Rural Doctors Association (n = 23), the Royal
Australasian College of Surgeons (n = 16) and the Royal Australian and New Zealand College of
Psychiatrists (n = 12).
Table 3. Top recorded advocacy interactions in health ministers’ diaries (January 2013–June 2018) *.
Health Minister QLD
(LNP) 24 Months
Health Minister QLD
(ALP) 39 Months
Health Minister NSW
(LP) 48 Months
Assistant Health
Minister NSW (LP)
31 Months
Medical association
(n = 62, AMA = 28)
Medical association
(n = 56, AMA = 24)
Medical association
(n = 68, AMA = 21)
Mental health
organisations
(n = 53)
Mental health
organisations
(n = 15)
Workers unions
(n = 36)
Cancer organisations
(n = 28)
Homelessness
organisations
(n = 40)
Indigenous organisations
(n = 13)
Indigenous organisations
(n = 35)
Citizen groups
(n = 17)
Drug & alcohol
organisations
(n = 36)
Cancer organisations
(n = 11)
Nurses’ union
(n = 28)
Workers unions
(n = 16)
Domestic violence
organisations
(n = 20)
Nurses’ union
(n = 11)
Mental health
organisations
(n = 19)
Nurses’ union
(n = 10)
Community services
charities
(n = 18)
Citizen groups
(n = 10)
Youth organisations
(n = 16)
Paramedics
(n = 10)
Medical
(n = 15, AMA = 2)
Emergency Medicine
Foundation
(n = 6)
Multicultural
organisations
(n = 14)
Children/youth charities
(n = 10)
Anti-windfarm groups
or individuals
(n = 14)
Hospital Foundation
(n = 6)
Citizen groups
(n = 13)
Heart disease
organisations
(n = 7)
Council of Social Services
(n = 13)
Royal Flying Doctors
Service
(n = 6)
Hospital Foundations
(n = 13)
Indigenous organisations
(n = 6)
Indigenous organisations
(n = 8)
Workers unions
(n = 6)
Disability organisations
(n = 6)
* n = total number of advocacy-related diary entries a Minister had during the period of time they held a
health portfolio.
For business groups, private hospitals topped interactions with the QLD Health Minister when
the LNP were in power (Table 4). In NSW, private health care services had the highest number of
interactions with the Health Minister, followed by private hospitals. Conversely, state and national
associations representing a popular code of football in Australia (Rugby League) had the greatest
interaction with the QLD Health Minister when Labour was in power.
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Table 4. Top recorded business interactions in health ministers’ diaries (January 2013–June 2018) *.
Health Minister QLD
(LNP) 24 Months
Health Minister QLD
(ALP) 39 Months
Health Minister NSW
(LP) 48 Months
Assis Health Minister
NSW (LP) 31 Months
Private Hospitals
(n = 16)
Rugby League
(n = 17)
Private health care
services
(n = 28)
Pharmaceutical
companies
(n = 15)
Aged Care
(n = 9)
Global
accounting/consulting
firms
(n = 13)
Private Hospitals
(n = 22)
Small
consultancy/investment
firms
(n = 10)
Infrastructure company
(n = 9)
Pharmacy guild
(n = 12)
Medical devices
(n = 15)
Private disability/mental
health companies
(n = 6)
Biotech company
(n = 6)
Property company
(n = 11)
Pharmaceutical
companies
(n = 11)
Construction/building
companies
(n = 5)
Property company
(n = 6)
General business
receptions
(n = 10)
IT companies
(n = 8)
Rugby League
(n = 3)
Private health care
services
(n = 5)
Biotech company
(n = 8)
Pharmacy guild
(n = 8)
Clean energy companies
(n = 3)
Construction company
(n = 5)
Taiwan business
representatives
(n = 8)
Global
accounting/consulting
firms
(n = 8)
Marketing/communication
companies
(n = 3)
Global
accounting/consulting
firms
(n = 5)
Aged Care
(n = 7)
Banks
(n = 7)
Chamber of Commerce
(n = 3)
Mining companies
(n = 4)
Law firms
(n = 7)
Law firms
(n = 7)
Small business owner
(n = 3)
3rd party lobbyists
(n = 4)
Pharmaceutical
companies
(n = 7)
Finance companies
(n = 7)
Local sports clubs
(n = 3)
* n = total number of advocacy-related diary entries a Minister had during the period of time they held a
health portfolio.
Very few interest groups met with the health ministers specifically regarding nutrition policy
issues (Table 5). Of the 5,025 interactions documented, only 16 related specifically to nutrition issues
and three of those included no interest group representation, instead involving only the Health Minister
and departmental staff. Only one interaction from the food industry (Australian Beverages Council)
was recorded regarding a specific nutrition policy issue.
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Table 5. Specific nutrition related issues documented in health ministers’ diaries (January 2013–June 2018).
Minister Issue Interest Group Date
QLD Health
Minister ALP
School
Breakfast Program YMCA
August 2015
September 2016
Childhood Obesity Happy Health Kids NFP November 2015
Cooking Skills Jamie’s Ministry ofFood Program March 2016
Diabetes prevention Diabetes QLD Oct 2017
Health Minister
QLD LNP
Anti-obesity program None October 2013
Junk food advertising None March 2013April 2013
Anti-obesity
multicultural
communities
Ethnic Communities
Council of Queensland March 2013
Front-of-pack
food labelling None December 2013
Cooking Skills Jamie’s Ministry ofFood Program May 2014
Cooking skills Queensland CountryWomen’s Assoc. December 2014
Health Minister NSW
Cooking Skills Jamie’s Ministry ofFood Program June 2015
Aboriginal Nutrition Newcastle University August 2015July 2016
National Nutrition Week Nutrition Australia July 2017
Healthy Choices in
Health Facilities Policy
Australian
Beverages Council July 2017
NSW Assistant
Health Minister
Obesity Obesity Support Council September 2014
Food preservatives Citizen October 2015
4. Discussion
The data in this study were obtained from unique datasets that had not been previously
systematically analysed. It is likely, however, that the diaries we have analysed do not capture
all the interactions that ministers undertake and we have no way of knowing how closely the diaries
represent a minister’s actual day. The level of detail provided in QLD provides a more complete
representation than in NSW, where diaries often have days with no entries at all (n = 609 days, 64% of
NSW health ministers’ days). However, valuable insights are still likely to be gained from the
5025 interactions that were recorded.
4.1. The Food Industry Is Poorly Represented
This analysis was originally undertaken to identify whether specific interest groups were engaging
regularly with state health ministers, particularly around nutrition policy issues. Despite previous
evidence in Australia [4] and internationally [15,16] highlighting direct and frequent engagement
of the food industry with health ministers, this was not found to be the case in the two Australian
state jurisdictions in this study. There may be several reasons for this, including the limited reporting
requirements for ministerial diaries (particularly for NSW), which do not capture after-hours activities,
informal meetings on the phone or in person, or who ministerial advisors are meeting with. Furthermore,
these groups may be meeting with more senior ministers, for example, the state premier or treasurer,
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or with other ministries related to food—such as agriculture or trade—or with government bureaucrats.
Finally, responsibility for many aspects of nutrition policy sits with the Australian government,
so relationship building may be directed there. However, any significant decisions that need to be made
around regulation or legislation in Australia require agreement between the Australian government
together with all the states and territories, so it is surprising that more interactions were not noted.
Alternatively, this lack of representation may also indicate that the ministers’ diaries are not a reliable
source for documenting interactions with the food industry.
4.2. Advocacy Organisations Are Leading Engagement
The results demonstrate high rates of interaction between ministers and advocacy organisations
in comparison to business interests. This differs from the previous research conducted on this issue.
Studies from the United States of America demonstrated that the majority of advocacy organisations
do not engage in ‘lobbying’ [17]. While this study does not examine the overall proportion of advocacy
organisations participating in interactions with Ministers, the higher proportion of meetings by these
organisations in comparison to the business sector may signify a change in practice over time. It may
also represent a willingness from ministers to engage more widely with advocacy organisations.
Medical associations, particularly the Australian Medical Association, had the greatest number of
interactions with ministers. This indicates not only a high level of activism by medical associations,
but also a high level of prioritisation of the medical profession by the ministers. This prioritisation
corresponds with the traditional view that medicine sits at the top of the occupational hierarchy in
health and is considered the cultural authority on health and illness [18]. The observed dominance
and influence of the medical profession is not unique to Australia, with several international studies
reporting a similar phenomenon [19–22].
Very few interest groups met with the health ministers specifically regarding nutrition issues.
This lack of engagement by nutrition professionals and not-for-profit groups advocating for nutrition
issues corresponds with previous research documenting the lack of direct contact with decision-makers
in nutrition policy in Australia [4]. This lack of engagement could represent a lack of understanding
of the policymaking process and the key role ministers play, and/or a lack of capacity from nutrition
advocates in terms of time, or advocates could be prioritising targeting national ministers instead of
state-based ministers [23]. However, it is important to note that interest groups may be meeting with the
ministerial advisers regarding these issues, and there is no requirement to document such interactions.
4.3. Market Solutions to Healthcare?
For business groups, private health care services and private hospitals topped the interactions
of the NSW Health Minister and the QLD Health Minister when the LNP were in power. This may
signify the growing trend towards finding market solutions to healthcare, a movement that is occurring
world-wide [24]. The high level of interactions with private hospital companies coincides with
a growth in private hospital beds and, accordingly, government funding for private hospitals in
Australia [25]. A very different approach was taken by the QLD ALP health ministers, where rugby
league associations had the greatest interaction. These meetings corresponded with additional QLD
government funding for the rugby league, including: AUD$1,000,000 to the National Rugby League
State of Mind program (designed to reduce stigma around mental illness through rugby league clubs)
in 2016, AUD$637,500 over two years for the improvement of rugby league facilities around QLD in
2017, and AUD$165,000 for a children’s rugby league program run by ex-players, also in 2017 [26,27].
Alternatively, these interactions may signify an awareness that the core constituents of the Labour
party in QLD are working class and traditionally follow the game of rugby league, so it may be an
important political strategy for the Minister to align with this popular code of football.
One final observation relates to the diary entries of the NSW Assistant Health Minister. This position
had a very different range of interactions compared to the health ministers in QLD and NSW, most
notably high levels of engagement with mental health organisations, homelessness charities and drug
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and alcohol charities. This increased engagement coincided with the Assistant Minister being named
Minister for Mental Health and then also Minister for Women and Medical Research. This suggests that
providing specificity in the ministerial title may result in higher levels of engagement with relevant
interest groups than if the title is broadly ‘health’.
5. Conclusions
We undertook this study to identify which interest groups were engaging with state health
ministers in Australia, particularly around nutrition policy. Previous research suggested that the food
industry would be a strong presence, but this was not the case in this study. Instead, advocates from
the medical profession dominated health ministers’ documented diary time, and from the business
side, private hospitals and rugby league associations dominated. Poor representation was seen on
nutrition issues, and there was an apparent lack of nutrition advocates interacting with the health
ministers. While the lack of documented interactions with the food industry raises questions regarding
the completeness of the diaries, the findings do provide valuable insight for a progressing nutrition
policy. Opportunities exist for nutrition advocates to increase their level of interaction with state
health ministers. This could involve building alliances with medical associations, as they are in a
powerful position to advocate directly to health ministers, and there are opportunities to collaborate on
mutually shared prevention issues. Ministerial diaries offer a unique dataset which, despite limitations,
are important to continue to monitor. To improve insights around lobbying further datasets, political
donations, for example, could be combined with this information.
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